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TORTS-EMOTIONAL HARM: LIMITATIONS ON THrn PARTY RE-
COVERY FOR EMOTIONAL HAl~m CAUSED BY FEAR OR CONCERN FOR
ANOTHER-Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wn. 2d 652, 497 P.2d 937
(1972).
Plaintiff hired fifteen-year-old Reed Christensen to care for her
five-year-old daughter upon the representation of his parents that he
was a good and capable baby-sitter. The parents knew but did not
disclose that their son had a lengthy history of sexually assaulting
young girls. In the span of five months the baby-sitter molested the
plaintiff's daughter between two and five times. Upon learning of the
assaults, plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress requiring treat-
ment by a physician, hospitalization, and psychiatric care. The plain-
tiffs claim against the defendant parents and their son alleged mental
anguish proximately caused her by the knowledge of sexual assaults
on her daughter. On motion for summary judgment, this claim was
dismissed as to the defendant parents.1 Held: As a matter of law there
can be no recovery for negligent inffiction of emotional harm absent
reasonable fear of or actual physical trauma. Schurk v. Christensen,
80 Wn. 2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972).2
Traditional negligence theory allows a plaintiff to recover for inju-
ries caused by the negligence of another when it can be shown that a
duty of care exists toward the plaintiff, the breach of which was the
legal cause of his injury.3 American jurisdictions, however, tradition-
ally have been reluctant to allow recovery in cases alleging only negli-
gent infliction of emotional harm and thus have imposed more strin-
gent requirements in such cases.4 Courts first allowed recovery only
where the emotional harm to the plaintiff was accompanied by actual
1. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, the text refers to Mrs. Schurk as the sole
plaintiff. In fact, this action was brought by both Schurk parents, each suing in his own
behalf. Both missed work after learning of the assault on their daughter, and each sought
damages from the defendant parents and their son for lost wages and related expenses.
Mrs. Schurk also sought damages from the three defendants for her mental distress. The
plaintiffs also brought an action as guardian ad litem in behalf of their daughter against
the defendant parents and their son, Reed Christensen. This latter claim was not in-
volved in the appeal.
2. The court reversed the dismissal of the Schurks' claims against the Christensen
parents for recovery of past and future expenses incurred for the benefit of their daugh-
ter, and for loss of wages of the Schurks, all resulting from the sexual molestations by
the defendant, Reed Christensen. The court sustained the trial court's dismissal of Reed
Christensen's motion for dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against him.
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). See also McCoy v. Courtney,
25 Wn. 2d 956, 172 P.2d 596 (1946).
4. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 327 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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physical injury or impact.5 The majority of American courts have now
rejected this "impact rule" and allow recovery for emotional harm
when the plaintiff was within the zone of physical danger and feared
for his personal safety.6 Because the courts require either impact or a
reasonable fear of impact, plaintiffs who have suffered emotional
harm because of fear or concern for another almost universally have
been denied recovery. 7
In 1968 the California Supreme Court rejected the majority rule,
holding in Dillon v. Leggs that a mother who had witnessed her
daughter being killed in a traffic accident could recover for mental
distress even though the mother was outside the zone of physical
harm. Discarding the zone of danger rule as the test for recovery, the
court developed its own criteria for determining foreseeability where
emotional harm results from fear for another. 9 At present, no other
state supreme court has followed California in allowing recovery for
emotional harm caused by concern for another. 10 Two other jurisdic-
tions, however, have explicitly rejected the zone of physical danger
5. Id. at 332. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897);
Ewing v. Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L.R.R., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892); Bowles v. May,
159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932). See also 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 134 for additional cases
following the impact rule.
6. PROSSER at 332. Most frequently cited in support of the zone of danger rule is
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935), where the court denied re-
covery to mother because she was outside the zone of physical danger when she wit-
nessed her child being run over by the defendant.
7. See, e.g., Jelly v. LaFlame, 238 A.2d 728 (N.H. 1968); Tobin v. Grossman, 30
App. Div. 2d 213, 219 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Super. Ct. 1968). But see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). For an extensive list of cases, see Smith,
Negligently Inflicted Emotional Shock from Witnessing the Death or Injury of Another,
I0 ARIz. L. REv. 508 n.2 (1968).
The great preponderance of case authority caused the ALl to omit its caveat as to
third party recovery from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965). See 37
ALI PROCEEDINGS 163, 169-70 (1960), and 40 ALI PROCEEDINGS 303, 308 (1963),
which suggest that the reporter and advisors acted on the basis of overwhelming case
authority rather than on personal conviction.
8. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). The state
supreme court's decision was extended by the court of appeals in Archibald v. Braver-
man, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969), where the mother who did not see
the accident but arrived on the scene immediately afterwards was allowed to recover.
But see Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 21 Cal. App. 3d 568, 98 Cal. Rptr. 631
(1971).
9. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
10. PROSSER at 334. But see Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo.
1965) (the opinion indicated that the court would have allowed recovery but for the fact
that it was bound by Colorado law), and Mason v. Gray, No. 22544 (Kootenai City Ct.,
Idaho, filed Sept. 26, 1967) (recovery allowed).
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rule in cases not involving third party recovery for emotional dis-
tress."
Washington is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions, holding
that recovery for negligent infliction of emotional harm is allowed
only where there has been an actual invasion of the plaintiffs person
or security, or a direct possibility thereof.12 The court in Schurk sug-
gested, however, that the rule would be re-evaluated when an appro-
priate case is presented. 13 The court concluded that Schurk was not
the proper case in which to make a change because it did not meet the
criteria developed in Dillon.14
It is the thesis of this note that the zone of danger rule must be
abandoned and that, furthermore, the Dillon test is not a viable alter-
native. Instead, recovery for emotional harm should be predicated
11. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (action under state tort
liability act by homeowners seeking damages for the flooding of their home); Wallace v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970) (action for emotional distress
caused by drinking from a bottle containing an unpackaged. prophylactic; while this is
essentially a food case, the court predicated recovery on a negligence theory rather than
strict liability).
12. The question was presented to the Washington court first in O'Meara v. Russell,
90 Wash. 557, 156 P. 550 (1916). There the court stated the zone of danger rule, but de-
cided the case on other grounds. The rule was considerably muddled when the court, in
Kneass v. Cremation Soc'y, 103 Wash. 521, 175 P. 172 (1918), stated that O'Meara's
mental anguish was the result of her physical injury and that since the Kneass' physical
harm was the result of their mental anguish they couldn't recover. Cherry v. General
Petroleum Corp., 172 Wash. 688, 21 P.2d 520 (1933), added to-the confusion when the
court seemingly approved the impact rule. This discord finally was resolved by Frazee
v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935). The court specifically
repudiated the impact rule and explained and approved O'Meara. See Richards, Re-
covery For lijury Without Impact: The Washington Cases, 13 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1938).
In certain well defined areas Washington does allow recovery for negligently inflicted
emotional harm where the plaintiff was outside the zone of physical risk. See Kneass,
supra (improper burial of plaintiff's deceased); Corcoran v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.,
80 Wash. 570, 142 P. 29 (1914) (negligent delivery of a telegram concerning a serious
illness--plaintiff was denied recovery, however, because he had not suffered any phys-
ical harm as a result of his mental distress); Wright v. Beardsley, 46 Wash. 16, 89 P. 172
(1907) (mutilation of a corpse).
Washington also allows a plaintiff to recover where the defendant's act was willful or
intentional. See, e.g., Theis v. Federal Finance Co., 4 Wn. App. 146, 480 P.2d 244
(1971) (wrongful seizure of property during attempted foreclosure); Brillhard v. Ben
Tipp, Inc., 48 Wn. 2d 722, 297 P.2d 232 (1956) (telephone harassment); Winston v. Ter-
race, 78 Wash. 146, 138 P. 673 (1914) (forceable entry and assault); Nordgren v. Law-
rence, 74 Wash. 305, 133 P. 436 (1913) (wrongful entry); McClure v. Campbell, 42
Wash. 252, 84 P. 825 (1906) (wrongful eviction); Ott v. Press Publishing Co., 40 Wash.
308, 82 P. 403 (1905) (libel); Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 P.
209 (1904) (expulsion from public park); and Willson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 5 Wash.
621, 32 P. 468 (1893) (expulsion from train).
13. 8OWn. 2d at 657, 497 P.2d at 940.
14. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
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upon traditional negligence principles. Schurk was a proper case in
which to make the change.
The usual justifications for the zone of danger rule are the threat of
fraudulent claims and the potentially unlimited liability of defendants
for every type of mental disturbance. 15 In Dillon the California court
rejected the fraudulent claims argument, recognizing that emotional
harm can cause physical harm and that it is inequitable to deny an
entire class of claims because a few isolated cases might be fraudu-
lent.1 6 An even more compelling argument is that medical science is
sufficiently competent to determine the existence of emotional trauma
and to detect fraudulent claims, thus minimizing the threat of unwar-
ranted recovery.17 Since the courts appear satisfied with the ability of
medical science to ferret out fraudulent claims when mental distress is
incidental to an independent cause of action, they should be satisifed
with the medical profession's ability to identify fraudulent claims
when the cause of action is founded on emotional harm alone.' 8
Moreover, there is no evidence that the zone of danger rule actually
prevents all fraudulent claims.' 9 A person within the zone of physical
danger can just as easily initiate a fraudulent claim as can a person
15. 80 Wn. 2d at 655, 497 P.2d at 939.
16. 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77. The Washington court in Borst v. Borst, 41
Wn. 2d 642, 653, 251 P.2d 149, 155 (1952), a parent-child immunity case, expressed a
similar sentiment, stating that:
[T] he fact that there may be a greater opportunity for fraud or collusion in one
class of cases than another does not warrant courts of law in closing the door to all
cases of that class. Courts must depend upon the efficacy of the judicial process to
ferret out the meritorious from the fraudulent in particular cases.
For a more spirited reply to the fraudulent claim argument, see Bosley v. Andrews, 393
Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263, 270 (1958) (dissenting opinion). The policy arguments noted by
the majority in Schurk are ably refuted by Justice Finley in his dissent. 80 Wn. 2d at
658, 497 P.2d at 941.
17. See, e.g., Comment, Mental Distress in Psychological Research, 21 BAYLOR L. REV.
520 (1969), in which the author discusses the various physiological changes which
occur when a person suffers emotional stress. Wasmuth, Medical Evaluation of Mental
Pain and Suffering, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 7 (1957), discusses investigations seeking to
evaluate emotional trauma on the basis of variations in the number and characteristics
of white blood cells. See also Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970),
where the court notes that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965) has eliminated
its caveat about the medical profession's ability to establish a causal relationship be-
tween the actor's negligence and the plaintiff's injury.
The use of medical science to detect malingering is discussed in Amdursky, The In-
terest in Mental Tranquility, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 339 (1964), and Cantor, Psychoso-
matic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis and the Law, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 428 (1957).
18. See note 12 supra.
19. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1034 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
HARPER & JAMES].
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outside the zone. Indeed, the zone of danger rule itself may encourage
persons who have suffered severe emotional distress to claim fraudu-
lently that their harm was caused by fear for their own safety.20 Ulti-
mately, the question of fraudulent claims can be resolved best by de-
veloping standards of proof rather than by denying all recovery. 21
An additional justification frequently offered in support of the zone
of danger rule is that it prevents potentially unlimited liability for
every type of mental disturbance.22 Several factors suggest that this
justification is invalid. First, even without the zone of danger rule a de-
fendent is liable only for severe emotional harm.23 This restriction is
essential since emotional harm of a trivial nature is inevitable in modern
society, and allowing recovery in such instances would create an
intolerable burden on the community.24 What constitutes severe, as
opposed to trivial harm is open to varied interpretation. 25 One possible
test is that the plaintiff might be deemed to have suffered severe emo-
tional harm when his condition requires medical attention (e.g., the
services of a doctor or hospitalization). This would effectively limit
recovery to circumstances where the plaintiff has suffered harm beyond
mere grief or outrage and at the same time provide a basis for determ-
ining damages.
A second limitation on potential liability is that in order to establish
negligence it must be established that a reasonable man in the defend-
ant's position could have foreseen that the defendant's act would
cause a normal person to suffer severe emotional harm.26 This is
20. For a discussion of this possibility see Comment, Dillon v. Legg-Extension of
Tort Liability in the Field of Mental Distress, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 116 (1969).
21. See Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILL.
L. REV. 232 (1961-62); Tymann, Bystander's Recovery for Psychic Injury in New York,
32 ALBANY L. REV. 490 (1968). See also Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d
84, 88 (1970).
22. 80 Wn. 2d at 655, 497 P.2d at 939.
23. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Knierim v.
Izzo, 22 I11. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Taft v. Taft, 40 Vt. 229, 94 Am. Dec. 389
(1867); Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 54 Wn. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859
(1959). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, commentj (1965); Prosser, In-
sult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 52 (1956).
24. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156,472 P.2d 509 (1970).
25. Id. The Rodrigues court suggested that mental distress is "severe" when a nor-
mally constituted man would be unable to adequately cope with the mental distress en-
gendered by the circumstances of the case. See also McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort
Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1949), where the author would require
that the mental distress be manifested by a physical injury or harm.
26. HARPER & JAMES at 1036. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313,
comment c (1965). Since normal persons are less likely than those suffering from--a--
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commensurate with the standard negligence principle that a defend-
ant, absent specific knowledge, is not liable for harm to an unusually
sensitive person where a normal person would not have suffered
harm.2 7
In Dillon the California court developed criteria for determining
whether the plaintiffs injury was foreseeable in accident cases. The
criteria are: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the
accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it; (2)
whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the ac-
cident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its
occurrence; (3) whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely re-
lated, as contrasted with lack of any relationship or existence of only a
distant relationship.2 8 Unfortunately, the Schurk court concluded that
even if the zone of danger rule were repudiated, under the Dillon test
the plaintiff would be unable to establish that her injury was foresee-
able by the defendant parents. 29
In relying on Dillon as the logical alternative to the zone of danger
rule, the Schurk court ignored several important considerations. First,
the criteria suggested in Dillon were not meant as iron-clad rules and
should not be construed as such. 30 They were intended to assist in de-
termining foreseeability, not to serve as a definitive test of liability.
pre-existing disorder to suffer emotional harm, this limitation is of considerable impor-
tance. McNiece, supra note 25. See also Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Dis-
ease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 284 (1944), where the au-
thor found that out of 301 cases studied, 216 plaintiffs had a pre-existing vulnerability
which made them more susceptible to injury than average persons would have been.
27. See, e.g., McKinzie v. Huckaby, 112 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Daley v.
LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663,
138 S.E.2d 541 (1964). The reason for this rule, of course, is that to determine whether
an act is negligent, it is necessary to determine whether a reasonable person could
foresee that the act would cause damage. Once negligence is established, the defendant is
liable for any aggravated harm incurred because of the plaintiffs idiosyncracies. See,
e.g., Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735,84 So. 37 (1920); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v.
Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916).
28. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
See also PROSSER at 334 [(1) harm must be serious, resulting in physical harm; (2) action
confined to members of immediate family of the one endangered; and (3) the plaintiff
must be present at the time of the accident, or at least the shock must be fairly con-
temporaneous]; Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965) [(1)
strength and vitality of the original force which the defendant set in motion; (2) peculiar
susceptibility of the plaintiff to nervous injury; (3) the relationship in time and space
to the original negligence; and (4) the relation of the plaintiff to the person endangered].
29. 80 Wn. 2d at 657, 497 P.2d at 940.
30. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
See also PROSSER at 335. Dean Prosser admits that the restrictions he suggests are arbi-
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Second, if the Dillon criteria were used as the test for recovery for
emotional harm, the court would have succeeded only in substituting
one mechanical test for another. Like the zone of danger rule, the
Dillon criteria place a premium on the plaintiff's fortuitously being in
the right place at the right time. If the plaintiff is not in close prox-
imity to the scene of the accident, does not view the accident, and is
not a close relative, he is excluded from recovery. This test, like its
predecessors, mechanically excludes meritorious claims which tradi-
tional negligence theory would allow. For example, it is apparent in
Schurk that the defendant parents could foresee the possibility of
harm when they recommended their son as a baby-sitter. Although
traditional negligence principles would clearly give the plaintiff in
Schurk a cause of action, the Dillon test would deny recovery in this
case for want of foreseeability. It is apparent that the Dillon test
cannot accurately measure foreseeability in all cases. Thus, if it were
used in place of the zone of danger rule, valid claims would continue
to be denied.
Since there is no valid reason for artificially limiting recovery for
emotional harm, the Dillon test is not a viable alternative to the zone
of danger rule. Instead, mechanical rules should be rejected and reli-
ance placed upon traditional negligence theory in determining
whether a plaintiff should be compensated for his injuries. Under tra-
ditional negligence theory, the plaintiffs recovery would depend
solely upon his ability to meet the requirements of a prima facie case
of negligence.3 1
A basic requirement of a prima facie case of negligence is the plain-
tiff's showing that the defendant owed him a duty of due care.32 Ev-
eryone has a general duty to exercise due care and to act as a reason-
ably prudent person,33 but in situations such as in Schurk, the defendant
trary, but he feels that they may be necessary to draw the line short of unlimited lia-
bility.
It should be noted also that the fact patterns in Dillon and Schurk are distinguishable.
Dillon involved a single automobile accident, while Schurk involved several assaults
over a five month period. The Dillon test may be of assistance in determining foreseea-
bility in cases similar to Dillon, but it is of little use in cases such as Schurk, where more
than one act is involved occurring over a period of time.
31. A prima facie case of negligence is established when duty, breach, causation and
injury are demonstrated. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 299 (1850), and Alexiou v.
Nockas, 171 Wash. 369, 17 P.2d 911 (1933).
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parents' duty is more precise. When parents know that their child had
dangerous tendencies, they have a two-fold duty: to exercise reason-
able care in controlling their child, and to warn others to whom the
child may pose a threat. 34 Once a duty is established, the crucial de-
termination is to whom is the duty owed.35
Whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff depends upon
whether a reasonable man in the defendant's position would foresee
that his act would cause a normal person in the plaintiff's position to
suffer harm.36 Thus, if the defendant should have foreseen that his act
might harm the plaintiff, the plaintiff is said to be within the zone of
risk in which the defendant owes him a duty of care. If the impact and
zone of danger rules are rejected, the zone of risk includes not only
the possibility of physical harm but also risk of emotional injury.
Hence, if traditional negligence theory is used, a defendant has a duty
not to subject others to a foreseeable risk of physical or severe emo-
tional harm.37 In Schurk, whether the plaintiffs emotional harm was
foreseeable under standard negligence theory was an issue of fact
which should have been determined by the trier of fact rather than by
the court as a matter of law.38
Once it is established that the defendant owed a duty not to subject
the plaintiff to a foreseeable risk of physical or severe emotional harm
34. Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E. 2d 706 (1962); Norton v. Payne,
154 Wash. 241, 281 P. 991 (1929). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316
(1965).
35. Courts denying recovery to persons whose mental distress was caused by con-
cern for another generally do so on the basis of a lack of duty owed to the plaintiff. See
Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965).
36. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). But see PROSSER
at 256. Dean Prosser suggests that it is the nature of the interest invaded and the type of
damage suffered which is the real obstacle, rather than foreseeability.
37. It has been persuasively argued that foreseeability is only one aspect of duty,
and that other factors also carry considerable weight in determining whether a duty ex-
ists. See, e.g., Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014
(1928). Professor Green would consider the administrative factor, the ethical or moral
factor, the economic factor, the prophylactic factor, and the justice factor.
Even assuming this view to be correct, there do not appear to be any policy consider-
ations dictating that recovery for emotional harm be denied. See text accompanying
notes 15-31 supra. See also PROSSER at 328, and Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). But see Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59
Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), overruled in Dillon, and Waube v.
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). In Amaya Justice Traynor concluded
that foreseeability of harm was outweighed by both administrative problems such as dif-
ficulty in proving causation and establishing rational limits on liability, and by the un-
desirability of imposing liability disproportionate to the degree of culpability. Accord,
Smith, Negligently Inflicted Emotional Shock from Witnessing the Death or Injury of
Another, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 508 (1968).
38. PROSSER at 290.
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and that he negligently breached that duty, the plaintiff still must
demonstrate that he was injured and that the injury was proximately
caused by the plaintiffs conduct3 9 Establishing that an emotional in-
jury has occurred should not prove to be an insurmountable task.
Medical science can assist in proving the existence of the injury and in
determining the extent of damage.40 Since the plaintiff in Schurk re-
quired medical attention, she probably would have had little difficulty
proving injury. Whether her injury was proximately caused by the
defendant parents was an issue of fact to be resolved by the trier of
fact.
Without the restrictive impact, zone of danger, or Dillon tests, stand-
ard negligence principles would allow persons such as the plaintiff in
Schurk to have their cases decided on the merits rather than by artifi-
cial rules. The artificiality of these rules is demonstrated by the fact
that in some cases a plaintiff is allowed to recover where the impact is
irrelevant to the resulting emotional injury,41 or where the injury has
no relationship to his being within a zone of physical danger.42 Neg-
ligence theory would eliminate less meritorious claims which now are
allowed under the impact or zone of danger rules. For example, a
plaintiff under the impact or zone of danger tests currently may re-
cover for mental distress if he can show either physical contact with
his person or presence within a zone of danger, regardless of whether
there was causation between the defendant's negligent act and his
emotional harm.43 Standard negligence theory would eliminate re-
covery in these circumstances because it requires that the plaintiff
establish the causal relationship between his injury and the defend-
ant's negligent act.4"
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
40. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
41. See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928)
(evacuation of horse's bowels onto plaintiffs lap held to be sufficient impact); Porter v.
Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 73 NJ. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in eyes sufficient impact);
Clark Restaurant Co. v. Rau, 41 Ohio App. 23, 179 N.E. 196, 197 (1931) ("any injury
no matter how slight").
42. See, e.g., Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918). Plaintiff's wife
was frightened and subsequently suffered physical harm when an escaped chimpanzee
entered her house and attacked her children. Even though she was within the zone of
danger, her complaint alleged that her injury was the result of fear for her children. The
court based recovery on the fact that she was within the zone of danger.
43. See, e.g., Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason-, 7
VILL. L. REV. 232 (1961); Comment, Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm:
A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 512 (1968).
44. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
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Traditional negligence theory would limit liability in one other re-
spect. The impact and zone of danger rules fail to discriminate be-
tween acts causing serious emotional harm in the medically normal
person, and those acts causing emotional harm only in the particularly
vulnerable person. As previously noted, traditional negligence theory
allows recovery only where the defendant's act would have harmed a
normal person, thereby limiting a defendant's potential liability. 45
Thus, rather than creating unlimited liability, standard negligence
theory actually would restrict liability in circumstances where the zone
of danger rule presently allows recovery.
CONCLUSION
Schurk v. Christensen presented the court with the opportunity to
re-examine the rule prohibiting recovery for the negligent infliction of
emotional harm in the absence of physical trauma or a reasonable
fear of it. While the court indicated that such a re-examination was
needed, it concluded that Schurk was not the proper case in which to
make a change.46 This decision was based primarily on the court's
conclusion that the plaintiff in the instant case did not meet the Dillon
criteria, which the court viewed as the logical alternative to the zone
of danger rule.
Instead of looking at the Dillon test as the only alternative, the court
should have allowed recovery to be based on traditional negligence
theory. The Dillon and zone of danger rules are unjustifiable both in
terms of evidentiary requirements and equity, and hence should have
been rejected. Instead, courts should apply general principles of tort
liability, determining recovery upon whether the plaintiff can establish
a prima facie case of negligence.
J.R.R.
45. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra. See generally Comment: Negli-
gence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock
Cases, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 512 (1968).
46. 80 Wn. 2d at 657, 497 P.2d at 940.
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